4.2.1 The Quest project (Canada)

In this section the monitoring plans for the Shell Quest project in Canada are analysed and discussed in terms of legislation. All information is based on documentation made publicly available through the website of Shell, including the appendix A of the project description documents describing the MMV plan (Shell, 2010).

The Quest project in Canada encompasses an integrated, full CCS chain, related to the exploitation of oil sands. Quest will capture more than one million tonnes of CO2 per year from Shell's Scotford Upgrader, located near Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta. It is planned to transport CO2 via a pipeline of about 80 km length in order to store in a highly saline sandstone aquifer of Cambrian age at a depth of about 2 km.

The starting point for the development of the monitoring (or MMV) plans has been the CO2QUALSTORE documents by DNV (2010a), where practical guidelines and examples are provided on how to develop this. The approach followed is risk based. The Bowtie Method (DNV 2010a) is used as an appropriate framework for a systematic risk assessment of events with the potential to affect storage performance. The monitoring plan includes multiple independent monitoring systems with the required sensitivity, response time, and scale to generate reliable early warnings of any potential loss of containment. It is linked to risks and to modelling in the following aspects:

  1. Loss of conformance; where conformance means the behaviour inside the storage complex is consistent with model-based predictions. Therefore, lack of conformance is a project risk relating to the long-term liability (and to the site closure) and not a HSSE-critical risk - a high-level risk analysis is sufficient for the monitoring plan
  2. Loss of containment; this is a HSSE-critical risk, so a detailed and comprehensive approach to the bow-tie analysis is required. These are possible impacts on groundwater and hydrocarbon resources, soil contamination, CO2 leaks into atmosphere, corrosion of legacy wells, CO2 migration along an injection well, caprock integrity. The monitoring targets include measurements of any changes within the hydrosphere, biosphere, and atmosphere caused by CO2 injected into the storage complex are sufficient to demonstrate the absence of any significant environmental impacts on an annual basis.

In both cases, two distinct types of preventative and corrective safeguards have been defined:

  1. Passive safeguards: These safeguards are always present from the start of injection and do not need to be activated at the appropriate moment. These passive safeguards exist in two forms:
    1. Geological barriers identified during site characterisation;

    2. Engineered barriers identified during engineering concept selections.

  2. Active safeguards: These are engineered safeguards, brought into service in response to some indication of a potential upset condition in order to make the site safe. Each active safeguard requires three key components in order to operate effectively:
    1. A sensor capable of detecting changes with sufficient sensitivity and reliability to provide an early indication that some form of intervention is required;

    2. Some decision logic to interpret the sensor data and select the most appropriate form of intervention;

    3. A control response capable of effective intervention to ensure continuing storage performance or to control the effects of any potential loss of storage performance.

From the risk assessment it can probably be concluded, that the major uncertainties for integrity of the reservoir are related to the (abandoned) wells penetrating the reservoir rock. Not only in terms of CO2 leakage, but possibly for brine migration out of the reservoir rock along these wellbores. This has been taken into account in the selection of the injection area, where the distance to existing wells has been maximized. Currently the closest well is at a distance of 21 km, and the closest updip well at 31 km.

This risk factor has a strong influence on the storage complex and the extent of the storage Area Of Interest (AOI), that is guided by the expected extent of the pressure front after 25 years of injection at an average rate of about 1 Mt per year. The AOI is not the same as the storage complex, but is a larger area that needs to be monitored. The safety margin and pressure monitoring threshold value ensuring safe operations is based on scenario modelling of different subsurface models, that predict the start of brine migration upwards through the legacy wells far away (20 km) as a function of the anticipated pressure rises. As raised earlier in the section comparing the IEA-MRF and the EU CCS Directive, the EU CCS Directive is much less prescriptive about how to deal with the pressure increase. It does show once more, that pressure monitoring is the key technology to ensure safe storage.

This example also shows the importance of taking uncertainty into account for modelling. An important statement was made in the documents by Shell, stating that the models should represent the entire uncertainty range, but need to provide sufficient confidence at the same time to carry on the operations. Again an issue, that is addressed in the storage directive as well, but in a "soft" manner. The expectation is of course, that uncertainties will diminish as more monitoring data comes in during operations.

In the documented monitoring plans, at least three deep monitoring wells are to be drilled where continuous pressure measurements will be carried out. For each injection well three groundwater monitoring wells will be drilled (in order to conduct electrical conductivity measurements and annual fluid sampling and analyses), at least one of them close to the injection well. Geochemical signatures of brine from the storage site (Cambrian saline aquifer) have been identified and are to be used in order to detect a possible brine leakage into groundwater during fluid sampling and analyses. In all injection wells a distributed temperature sensing system will be installed.

In general the monitoring encompasses in-well monitoring to ensure integrity of the well and to monitor downhole parameters like pressure, geochemical monitoring at various levels from shallow and deep wells, geophysical methods to monitor the CO2 extent and possibly pressure increases, and near surface monitoring.

As an early warning system for leakage, both geophysical and in-well techniques are used. In the Quest project monitoring from wells in the aquifer above the storage reservoir is also envisaged to detect anomalies in chemical composition of pressure increases.

Concerning geophysics, a baseline 3D surface seismic survey is planned. 3D VSP surveys are to monitor the CO2 plume extent at the early stage of injection. Once the plume spreading becomes too extensive to be covered by the VSP measurements, a repeat 3D surface seismic survey will take over.

Other techniques operating at the surface include InSAR data designed to monitor surface heave induced by CO2 storage and remote sensing data designed to detect environmental change (e.g. multi-spectral image analysis) are to be acquired. Also the line of sight CO2 gas flux monitoring will be applied.

More details on the monitoring approach including a full list of techniques can be found in the documentation on the website.